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	<title>Comments on: New York Times Financial Columnist Shows Dreadful Lack of Common Sense</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.ragingblog.com/2009/03/new-york-times-financial-columnist-shows-dreadful-lack-of-common-sense/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.ragingblog.com/2009/03/new-york-times-financial-columnist-shows-dreadful-lack-of-common-sense/</link>
	<description>Charles Carreon</description>
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		<title>By: Neal J. King</title>
		<link>http://www.ragingblog.com/2009/03/new-york-times-financial-columnist-shows-dreadful-lack-of-common-sense/comment-page-1/#comment-9</link>
		<dc:creator>Neal J. King</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2009 20:42:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ragingblog.com/?p=352#comment-9</guid>
		<description>The best arguments I&#039;ve seen in favor of the payments to the AIG folks have been provided by Nate Silver (of &lt;b&gt;www.fivethirtyeight.com&lt;/b&gt;), based on his study of AIG&#039;s 2007 10-K filing. The basic point was that the compensation for these folks had been primarily based on profits (historically), and they were already looking at a losing year. In order to hold people in their jobs, as opposed to leaving in 2007, they had to guarantee their compensation &lt;b&gt;independent&lt;/b&gt; of results. So from that point of view, the agreed payments were not a bonus (no one was expecting favorable results at that point, so nobody could expect a bonus) but rather a quick &amp; dirty way of converting from an incentivized contingency-based scheme to a salary-based system - albeit one with a large lump-sum payment. 

From that point of view, if that was promised to them as a form of salary, without which they would have left in 2007, there is some justification for honoring the agreement. Of course, a counter-balancing good point is that the amount of compensation that was expected by professionals in those fields (and I have &lt;b&gt;heard&lt;/b&gt; that these were quants (analysts and modelers, not executives) is pretty darn high, amounting to about 1/3 of profits in the good years. This seems to be a ridiculously generous approach to compensation, highly skewed towards incentivizing risk.

So if Silver&#039;s analysis is correct (and if I have interpreted correctly), the real problem was not with the agreement for the results-independent &quot;bonus&quot; in the last couple of years, but with the general compensation scheme.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The best arguments I&#8217;ve seen in favor of the payments to the AIG folks have been provided by Nate Silver (of <b><a href="http://www.fivethirtyeight.com" rel="nofollow">http://www.fivethirtyeight.com</a></b>), based on his study of AIG&#8217;s 2007 10-K filing. The basic point was that the compensation for these folks had been primarily based on profits (historically), and they were already looking at a losing year. In order to hold people in their jobs, as opposed to leaving in 2007, they had to guarantee their compensation <b>independent</b> of results. So from that point of view, the agreed payments were not a bonus (no one was expecting favorable results at that point, so nobody could expect a bonus) but rather a quick &amp; dirty way of converting from an incentivized contingency-based scheme to a salary-based system &#8211; albeit one with a large lump-sum payment. </p>
<p>From that point of view, if that was promised to them as a form of salary, without which they would have left in 2007, there is some justification for honoring the agreement. Of course, a counter-balancing good point is that the amount of compensation that was expected by professionals in those fields (and I have <b>heard</b> that these were quants (analysts and modelers, not executives) is pretty darn high, amounting to about 1/3 of profits in the good years. This seems to be a ridiculously generous approach to compensation, highly skewed towards incentivizing risk.</p>
<p>So if Silver&#8217;s analysis is correct (and if I have interpreted correctly), the real problem was not with the agreement for the results-independent &#8220;bonus&#8221; in the last couple of years, but with the general compensation scheme.</p>
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